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1950]

RECENT DECISIONS

In spite of this apparent judicial predisposition that an award of
damages in patent litigation is an award of compensation for gains or
profits to the patent owner, the court in the instant case suggests two
avenues of hope for the taxpayer. First, the taxpayer in his complaint
in the patent infringement action should allege specifically "loss or
damage to capital" and not merely ask for "damages." The second test
suggested is that the master in making the award should take evidence
of damage to the plaintiff's capital and make the award to compensate
the taxpayer for such loss. However, in view of the Act of Congress
of 19468 making the basis of recovery in patent infringement actions
general damages, abolishing sessions before Masters, the two tests presented seem to have practical significance only in patent infringement
suits commenced prior to 1946.

PATRICIA MAHONEY

Torts- Remedies Available for Continuing Trespass -Agents
of
the defendant, city of New York, had placed refuse on Plaintiff's land
over a substantial period of time and failed to remove it. Plaintiff
commenced action within six months of the last dumping but failed
to allege whether he was suing in trespass or for nuisance. The New
York Code contained a statute of limitation which provided for recovery against the city only if the action were commenced within six
months of the alleged offense. Plaintiff was desirous of recovery for
all the damage done by the numerous disposals, but the city contended
that plaintiff could recover only for the last trespass. Held: The claim
here was for non-feasance and the plaintiff did not claim damages for
the overt act. This was a continsing trespass against which the statute
of limitations will not run. Bompton Realty Company v. City of New
York, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 780, (1949).
This case is a typical example of the tendency of the courts to make
no distinction between a problem involving a continuing trespass and
one involving a private nuisance. Originally the courts held to the hard
fast rule that when a plaintiff who had a cause of action at law sought
an injunction, the question must be decided in a court of law prior
to resort to equity.' The reason was given that if the plaintiff had an
SAct of Congress, 1946, amending Revised Statutes 4921

(U.S.C.A. title 35,
Patents, Sec. 70) "The several courts vested with jurisdiction of cases arising
under the patent laws shall have power to grant injunctions according to the
course and principles of courts of equity, to -prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon
a judgment being rendered in any case for an infringement the complainant
shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be due compensation
for making, using or selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royalty
therefor, together with such costs, and interest as may be fixed by the court ...
See Senate Committee on Patents, Senate Report No. 1503, June 14, 1946. See
Biesterfeld, Chester, PatentLaw,Ch. XVI, pp. 166-169.
1 Zander v. Valentine Blatz Brewing Company, 95 Wis. 162, 70 N.W. 164 (1897);
Mercantile Library Co. v. University of Pennsylvania, 220 Pa. 328, 69 Atl. 861
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adequate remedy at law he should seek recourse in that court.
Thus the case under discussion presents the question whether if
the plaintiff seeks relief for trespass he can only recover for the last
trespass of the defendant on his land. This, of course, was the contention of the defendant. If the technical definitions of tresspass and
nuisance are strictly followed and the continuing aspect ignored the
defendant's contention was correct. The distinction between the two
has always been fairly clear. A trespass is a direct infringement of
one's property interests while a nuisance is the result of an act which
is not wrongful in itself but only in the consequences which may flow
from it.2 More generally stated, a nuisance consists of the use of one's

own property in such a manner as to cause injury to the property or
other right or interest of another and generally results from the commission of an act beyond the limits of the property affected.3 Under
these rules the placing of ground upon the land of another should be
considered a trespass, and the statute of limitation should begin to run
at the time of the entry.4
Today, however, where there is such an invasion which continues
through failure to remove the object left on the land there is a continuing trespass so long as it remains, and the statute of limitations will
not begin to run. 5 Notice the similarity to nuisance, and yet it has
been held that the proper place to commence an action for a continuing
trespass is in a court of law.:
In view of what has been said it can be seen that the term "continuing tresspass" is used synonymously with nuisance. It is aptly put
by Prosser:
"A continuing trespass affords a continuing cause of action,
a nuisance and has been
which can hardly be distinguished from
7
dealt with indiscrimantely as either."
To this point it appears that a continuing trespass is treated as a
nuisance although it bears the label of tresspass. What is the redemy
awarded for the wrong? Walsh says:
"Injunction will be made against continuous tresspass or a succession of trespasses which threaten to be continued indefinitely,
in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits.""
(1908); Methodist Episcopal Soc. v. Akers et. al., 167 Mass. 560, 46 N.E. 381
(1897); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Taylor, 138 Ky. 437, 128 S.W. 325 (1910);
City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 Ill. 111, 102 N.E. 992 (1913).
246 C. J. 651, par. 12.
3 Ingmudson v. Midland Continental R.R., 42 N.D. 455, 173 N.W. 752 (1919).

4Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170 Iowa 653, 150 N.W. 674 (1915).

5 Garcia et. al. v. Sumrall et. al., 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P. (2d) 640 (1942) ; Hotelling
6 v. Walther, 169 Or. 559, 130 P. (2d) 944 (1942).
White v. St. Louis Post Office Corporation, 348 Mo. 961, 156 S.W. (2d) 695
(1941).
7 Prosser on Torts, page 579, par. 73 (1941).
8Walsh on Equity, page 151, par. 30 (1930).
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A person whose property is thus affected might have an election to
ask for damages sufficient to place him in status quo, or for a mandatory injunction ordering restoration of the property to its former
condition. 9
A fine distinction between continuing tresspass and nuisance does
not exist. The terms are used interchangeably but only to the extent
that'a continuing tresspass is a nuisance.
JEROME J. DORNOFF

Torts - Duty of Business Proprietor to Customer for Safety of Premises - Plaintiff entered the defendant's restraurant for a midday meal
and immediately inquired of the proprietor's wife as to the location
of the restroom. Pointing to a door on the opposite side of the premises, the proprietor's wife replied, "around there". Plaintiff proceeded
toward the door indicated, opened it, and fell headlong down a flight
of stairs. The door was- not marked and there was no sign in the
restaurant indicating the location of the restroom. The trial court reasoned that there being no signs to direct the plaintiff, she assumed the
risk by entering an unmarked door, and directed a verdict for the defendant. Held: Judgment reversed. The jury might have found that
the defendant maintained a restroom on the premises as an integral
part of the restaurant business and there was a general invitation to
make use of it. The question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence
was for the jury. Hickman v. Dutch Treat Restaurant, 3 N.J.460, 70
Atl.(2d)764 (1950).
Unquestionably, the plaintiff in the principle case, being a business
visitor, was an invitee.' The invitor owes an affirmative duty to protect the invitee not only from dangers of which he knows, but also
against those dangers which he might discover through the exercise
2
of reasonable care.
While it is uncontroverted that the customer of a store, while in
the store proper, is an invitee,3 the perplexing question is 'at what
point does the status of an invitee change to that of a licensee, and
9

Irvine v. City of Oelwein, supra, note 4; Huber v. Stark et. al., 124 Wis. 359,
102 N.W. 12 (1905).
Boneau v. Swift & Co., (Mo. App.), 66 S.W. (2d) 172 (1934). A person is
an invitee if on the premises for a purpose connected with the business of the
owner or occupant. For other definitions of 'Invitee' see also Words &
Phrases.
2See Prosser on Torts, p. 635.
SLyle v. Megerle, 270 Ky. 227, 109 S.W. (2d) 598 (1937). It will be noted in
the principal case that the court dispensed with the issue of the unmarked door
in this wise: "The fact that the unlocked door was not marked as the entry
to the restroom is not in itself conclusive; there was no sign contrariwise and
it is reasonably inferable that it was the door which the plaintiff believed (the
proprietor) had indicated as the entry to the restroom." It would appear
from this that a business visitor has the right to rely upon the words of the
proprietor in place of a sign. But it would appear that such an invitation
must be construed in the light of the nature of the business. Cf. Ftn. 11, infra.
1

